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Although project finance is a large and fast growing field in finance, there has 
been very little academic research in that area. The main reason for this deficit 
is that it is a relatively new sphere in finance and it is difficult to access the 
information about the implementation of projects from the companies that 
implement them. This project will provide an overview of how companies 
finance large infrastructure projects through a case study of the Kazakhstan 
Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) project. The project will elucidate the 
current situation in project finance in the oil sector of Kazakhstan; the risks and 
considerations related to the implementation of large infrastructure projects in 
emerging markets and recommendations on how to approach the financing and 
structuring of the KCTS project. The KCTS project has a strategic importance for 
Kazakhstan as it will create a single energy transportation corridor from Asia to 
Europe towards the Mediterranean Sea allowing diversification of Kazakhstan 
export routes for oil thus securing substantial economic benefits. The key 
feature of the KCTS project is its strong linkage with the Kashagan oil field and 
transportation systems including an international oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan. In addition, the KCTS project’s sponsors are national companies of 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is important to consider the issues that 
should be addressed before the financing can be finalised: acknowledge the 
interdependency between all participants of the Trans-Caspian Transportation 
system; ensure guarantees of oil volumes shipped through the KCTS; address 
all the risks of the project; consider the possibility of participation of shippers in 
equity stakes and arrange additional funds for any contingencies. The financing 
structure of the project depends on several aspects inherent in the project: 
risks, political issues, the stance of the sponsor company, the current situation 
in world financial markets and the financial and political situation in a host 
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The analysis of project finance: a case study of the Kazakhstan 





Project finance is a relatively new but large and fast growing field in finance. 
Culp and Forrester (2010, p.522) define project finance as “the extension of 
credit to finance an economic unit where the future cash flows of that 
unit serve as collateral for the loan”. Although some type of limited 
recourse financing of standalone projects has been available for centuries 
(Kensinger and Martin, 1988), the modern history of project finance began in 
the 1970s with the development of the North Sea oil and gas fields (Hainz and 
Kleimeier, 2004). Despite its size there has been very little academic research 
into project finance (Esty, 2003). Esty (2004) argues that one reason for 
studying project finance is that it is firstly a particularly interesting and effective 
tool for highlighting the impact of financial structures on the value of a company 
and, moreover, illustrates why financial structures matters. The financial 
structure of an asset directly affects whether that asset obtains funds and how 
much it is worth. Therefore, Esty believes that project finance has the potential 
to broaden and develop new financial theories and in practice, is an increasingly 
important financing vehicle. 
Esty (2004) suggests that one reason why so little research has been conducted 
on project finance is because of difficulties accessing detailed information and 
problematic undertaking quantitative research in this area. As most project 
companies are private, only limited information about projects is available to 
the public. In terms of statistical analysis, globally there are about 300 projects 
every year but only 40 to 50 of them cost more that $500 million (ibid). These 
projects often have long lives and many specific characteristics attributed to the 
country, industry, and management. Consequently, statistical tests are 
unreliable and the results from one project are not applicable to other projects 
(ibid).  In this respect, the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation Project (KCTS) 
case study will contribute to the literature on project finance by examining the 
operation of project finance with particular reference to the oil and gas sector in 
developing countries.   
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Project finance is often used to finance industrial projects such as oil fields, 
pipelines, mines and infrastructure projects. The amount of global project 
finance lending in 2010 made up $167 billion, while the demand for the next 20 
years is expected to be $40 trillion (KPMG, 2010). Nowadays, the demand for 
capital and infrastructure investment is growing particularly in developing 
countries. In Kazakhstan the oil and gas sector are key industries and oil 
production is projected to increase dramatically in the next 10 years meaning 
that new projects are emerging requiring huge investments. Given the demand 
for investment and the growing importance of project finance as a financing 
tool, corporate managers, bankers and government officials need to understand 
what project finance is, why it creates value and how to manage it (Esty, 
2004).  
The aim of the following management project is to examine how big 
infrastructure projects can be financed in order to provide recommendations to 
KMG-TransCaspiy Limited Liability Partnership about financing of the Kazakhstan 
Caspian Transportation System (KCTS) Project. Therefore, the management 
project will focus on the principles, structure, and possible sources of finance for 
project financing and will provide relevant case studies related to financing big 
infrastructure projects. Finally, the KCTS case study will be presented followed 
by considerations and recommendations for the KCTS project financing. 
According to Esty (2004) project companies are “strategic research sites” for 
those interested in learning about how the structural attributes of project 
finance affects managerial incentives and asset values. “Standalone project 
companies are attractive research sites because they provide a 
relatively clear window into the process by which managers make 
important financing and structuring decisions” (ibid, p.214). Moreover, 
large projects such as KCTS, which has an estimated total cost of $4.9 billion 
are more interesting than smaller projects as they allow for an assessment of 
how managers make investment and financing decisions. In such cases 
managers have greater incentives and greater risks: there is considerably more 
money at stake and their personal wealth and professional reputation are on 
the line (Esty, 2004). 
The management project will be useful for researchers and financial specialists 
who are interested in project finance in the Kazakhstan oil sector. It will also be 
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relevant for a group of the companies within the national holding NC 
KazMunaiGas and other companies that fulfil investment projects in similar 
industries and will provide a broader view on decision making regarding the 
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2 Research Methodology 
Hammersley (2011) states that methodology is an essential part of scientific 
research both at the practical and theoretical levels. Hesse-Biber and Leavy 
(2011) claim that methodology is a component of social reality that goes further 
than what has been empirically examined. Depending on the research goal(s) or 
question(s), there are three research methods: quantitative, qualitative and 
mixed (both quantitative and qualitative) (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2002). 
Mason (1996) defined qualitative research as based on a philosophical stance 
which is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, 
experienced or produced. Methods of data generation in qualitative research are 
flexible and sensitive to the social context in which data are collected. The aim 
of qualitative research is to create fundamental understandings on the basis of 
rich, contextual, and detailed data. Qualitative research employs three methods 
of data collection:  
1. Observations – the method where the researcher observes and takes 
notes about the behaviour and actions of individuals at the research site. 
2. Interviewing – the method where the researcher conducts in-depth 
interviews to explore research question. 
3. Documents and visual data – the method where the researcher uses 
documents and visual materials.   
Quantitative research is used to explain phenomena through numerical data that 
are analysed using mathematically based methods. Quantitative research can be 
conducted using experimental and non-experimental methods. The first is based 
on experiment and common for scientific research, while the second is based on 
surveys and mostly used in social sciences (Muijs, 2004). 
‘Case study is not a method or methodology but rather an expansive field within 
the qualitative paradigm’ (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2011, p.256). Case study is 
an in-depth examination from different perspectives of the complexity and 
uniqueness of a specific project, system, or institution in a real life context. The 
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This management project is based on a qualitative research method and 
presents a case study as a way of investigating and examining how and why 
companies use project finance, how big projects can be financed, what are 
possible financing structures and sources of project finance, and what 
considerations companies should address before implementing big projects. This 
study is done with specific reference to the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation 
System project. The case study approach is applied in the project as it allows 
the researcher to explore in-depth the complexity and specificity of project 
finance using experience of companies in financing large infrastructure projects 
and then present the experience of Kazakhstani oil transportation company 
which is currently undertaking the implementation of a massive integrated 
infrastructure project. To explore research questions documents and visual data 
were used as well as interviewing of the key managers in the field was 
conducted. The practical part of the management project is built on the basis of 
data provided mainly by the project company KMG-TransCaspiy LLP and 
interviews conducted with the Executive Director of KMG-TransCaspiy LLP, 
manager of sponsor company NC KazMunaiGas, and manager of affiliated 
company KasMorTransFlot. The information that was obtained from the 
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3 Literature Review 
3.1 What is Project Finance? 
	  
Currently, there are few studies of project finance (Esty, 2004, Moutier, 2010). 
However, different definitions of project finance are provided. For instance, 
Finnerty (1996, p.2) defines project finance as: 
“the raising of funds to finance an economically separable capital 
investment project in which the providers of the funds look 
primarily to the cash flow from the project as the source of funds 
to service their loans and provide the return of and a return on 
their equity invested in the project.” 
 Fabozzi and Nevitt (2000, p.1) however, define it as: 
“A financing of a particular economic unit in which a lender is 
satisfied to look initially to the cash flow and earnings of that 
economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan will be 
repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as collateral for the 
loan.” 
       Esty (2004, p.25) defines project finance more specifically: 
“Project finance involves the creation of a legally independent 
project company financed with nonrecourse debt (and equity from 
one or more sponsors) for the purpose of financing a single 
purpose, industrial asset where nonrecourse debt means that debt 
repayment is made from the project company only, not from any 
other entity.” 
Culp and Forrester defined project finance as provision of a credit to an 
economic unit where the future cash flows of that project will be the only source 
of repayment for the credit (2010). According to Moutier (2010) isolation of 
resources imposes a direct risk on lenders with regard to the future profit of the 
project. The traditional approach of financing internal company projects 
assumes that the project is one of many other assets in the company’s portfolio 
and projects as a whole generate the cash flows, which are used to repay the 
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loans. Thus, risks are combined and diversified as profitable projects can 
compensate unprofitable ones (Brealey et al, 1996). 
Gearing in project finance is usually very high as debt can reach 80% or 90% of 
the total investment. The fundamental principle is that income risk is carried by 
the loan providers. Loans can be either "without recourse" or "with limited 
recourse" to the concession company's shareholders. Thus, lenders may not 
fully lessen their risks because they are dependent on the decisions of 
shareholders. Consequently, they must build complex contractual schemes to 
secure their interests (Moutier, 2010). On the other hand, Shah and Thakor 
(1987) suggest that project finance allows high gearing for risky projects, as it 
decreases information asymmetries between concessionaires and lenders. This 
occurs because the creation of a special-purpose vehicle isolates the project 
assets from its parent company, thus making it possible for loan providers to 
access detailed information with regard to the project. 
Shah and Thakor also proposed that project finance is a form of "dequity" (a 
combination of the words, "debt" and "equity"), dequity follows standard debt 
"rules" (for instance: debt is serviced at definite dates); but in the event of 
bankruptcy risk, senior managers may suspend the rules temporarily in order to 
maximize the firm's value. John and John (1991) claimed that project finance is 
advantageous when managers underinvest because of risky debt. Their 
theoretical analysis found the optimal leverage for a company. The model 
showed that a project financing arrangement, where the debt is optimally 
distributed between the sponsor company and the new venture, increases the 
value of the firm by reducing the agency costs and providing tax shields. Their 
model also shows that advertising a project finance programme may increase 
the sponsor company’s share price.  
Kleimeier’s (1993) empirical analysis challenged John and John’s conclusions 
about share price. Her study concluded that the announcement of project 
finance deal does not significantly affect the sponsor’s share price. She further 
stated that banks are sufficiently compensated for the risks they bear in lending 
without recourse.  Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) concluded that margins in 
project finance are lower than margins in syndicated loans contracted for 
mergers and acquisitions and, on average, less than margins of syndicated 
loans. Brealey et al (1996) believes that project finance is a response for 
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agency problems that occur from the different and sometimes conflicting 
interests of project participants. The high gearing of project finance deals can 
be attributed to low bankruptcy costs of a project company. The decision to 
place the debt on the project company’s accounts can be explained by the 
difficulties and costs relating to the correct distribution of the free cash flow or 
the existence of several sponsors with conflicting interests. 
3.2 Project Finance in the Oil and Gas Industry 
According to Culp and Forrester (2010), oil and gas projects are second only to 
power projects for using project finance loans. In total, oil and gas project 
finance loans constitute 15 to 20 per cent of all projects (ibid, p.523). 
Traditionally, oil and gas companies have funded projects by internal cash flows 
or by corporate borrowing from commercial lenders. Nowadays, particularly 
after the financial crisis of 2008-2009, access to traditional sources of capital 
has become extremely difficult. According to Milbank et al (1996), as profits in 
downstream projects (sale of crude oil) have declined companies are not as 
willing to undertake public offerings. Although the tightening credit 
requirements have made corporate borrowing less available the demand for 
financing is still high. In these conditions of a growing demand for funds and a 
shrinking availability of investment capital, project finance has become an 
alternative option for oil and gas projects. However, interest in project finance is 
not driven solely by the search for alternative financing. Project finance can also 
be an instrument for the allocation of risks that are associated with emerging 
market projects. As most oil and gas companies in developing countries are 
state companies, there is a lack of available governmental funds in this sector 
coinciding with a huge demand for capital investments. Therefore, governments 
are now allowing private ownership or long-term leases of major oil and gas 
projects and infrastructure developments. Nowadays, sponsors are using project 
finance to fund projects in the public sector (Milbank et al, 1996).  
3.3 Project Participants and Their Objectives 
The main participants of the project finance who have a major stake in the 
project are lenders, sponsors and host governments in international projects. 
The detailed list of project participants is presented below in Figure 1. 
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Milbank et al (1996) suggest that it is important to understand the objectives of 
the main stakeholders in the project. As the future cash flows of the project will 
be the only source of repayment in project finance, investors look to the 
creditworthiness and merits of the project, rather than to the project sponsors. 
Most sponsors aim to obtain an attractive rate of return on their investment. 
However, because in project finance lenders bare higher risk, they expect higher 
risk return rate. To attract private foreign investment, host countries will have 
to accept greater returns for the foreign investor than those that are available in 
the domestic market. However, such sponsors are advantageous for lenders as 
they are ready to support the execution of a project. Many participants such as 
suppliers, have short-term goals to secure contracts. Although these 
participants can invest in a project, their original incomes lie in securing related 
supply contracts and therefore, their motivation to the long-term stability of the 
project can be modest.  
The goals of governments include the following: 
• broadening sources of financing in order to develop capital intensive 
projects; 
• relieving financial and administrative burdens on governments; 
• enhancing the development of new technologies; 
• training host country citizens in skilled jobs; 
• creating competition which leads to lower prices for new suppliers; 
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Figure 1: Participants in Project Financing 
 
Developer/ Sponsor 
Initiator of the project 
Host Government/ Regulators  
Federal,  State, Local 
Lenders 
Subordinated Debt, Senior Debt, 
Co-financing, Bonds 
 
Performance/ Payment Bond 
Underwriter 
  
Offtaker or Purchaser 





Ground Leaser, Seller, Grantor 
	  Supplier 
Fuel, Resource, Inventory 
Contractor 
Engineering, Procurement, Construction 
Engineers 
Independent Engineers, Environmental 
Engineers 
Consultants 
Insurance consultant, Resource 
consultant, Environmental consultant 
Management 
Business/ Financial, Facility operation and 
maintenance, Overhaul 
Transportation 
Wheeling, Interconnection, Fuel 
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Source: Milbank et al (1996) pp. 5-6. 
3.4 Structure of Project Finance 
Milbank et al (1996) states that project financing starts with a single-purpose 
company formed by the sponsors of the project with the aim of owning and 
operating the project. Due to the risks involved in modern projects, project 
companies form a consortium or joint venture of sponsors whose major assets 
are the project, including real property, mineral rights, equipment, contractual 
rights, shares in the project company, licences and other governmental 
consents. Investment in the project is made to the project company itself and 
secured by the assets of the project company.  
Sometimes project sponsors may establish a project such as a “tenancy-in 
common” where each sponsor has a share in the project and the profit of the 
project is divided proportionately according to the share invested. A tenancy-in-
common vehicle is not an independent organisation and cannot independently 
borrow or be involved in other contracts. Nonetheless, such projects can be 
financed by entering into similar credit agreements to borrow its share of debt 
finance from the same lenders (ibid). Lease structure is another type of project 
finance structure, where equity investors own the facility and lease it to the 
project company. This kind of structure provides tax benefits separating 
ownership from control of the project, and reducing the project’s capital costs 
by assigning tax benefits to an equity investor.  During the lease term, the 
lessee (the project company) has the right to the residual cash flow after the 
payment of lease rent. At the end of the lease term, the lessee may exercise his 
option to buy assets if he had previously negotiated such an option. 
Synthetic lease or off-balance sheet financing is another form of non-recourse 
financing. Under this type of structure a special purpose entity (project 
company) acquires or owns the facility and leases it to a producer for a long-
term lease. The project company can issue notes to investors to finance 
acquisition while the operating lease guarantees the loan.  The rent payments 
under the lease correspond to interest payments on the investment of the 
lessor. The synthetic lease enables the producer to deduct depreciation and 
interest payments for tax purposes and treats rental payments as operating 
expenditures, not as debt or capital expenses (Milbank et al, 1996).  
There are royalty trusts and master limited partnerships that can be used 
specifically in the oil and gas sector. Under royalty trust structure oil and gas 
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companies form a trust from their reserves. Cash flows from the trust may be 
directed to pay dividends to trust participants. Investors receive yields linked to 
oil and gas prices, which formulate the amount of cash flow from the reserves in 
the trust, but without the risks of new drilling. Interest in master limited 
partnerships can be represented by depository receipts traded in the secondary 
market, which makes them more liquid than royalty trusts (ibid).  
Nwachukwu (2000) presented two main methods of capital project financing. 
The first is “contractor financing” or “turnkey project finance”, when the 
contractor is required to raise the funds, manage the project’s execution and 
deliver the accomplished project to the owner. The second method, part-debt 
financing where the owner borrows part of the money required, and another 
part provides from his equity capital.  
3.5 The Difference of Project Financing from Corporate Financing  
In order to illustrate the difference between corporate and project financing, BP 
Amoco financing structures from Esty’s case study (2004) are presented (Figure 
2).  
Figure 2: BP Amoco Financing Structure 
Corporate Financing Structure 





Business Treasury Short-term Financing





Susidary 1 Subsidary 2 Subsidary 3
Project 1 Project 2
$250m $350m
Partner A Project 3 Partner B
25% share Cost=$1 bln 35% share
25% 35%
of cash flow of cash flow
Operating Cash Flow
 
Source: Esty (2004), p.141.  
	  
	  
	   18	  
 
 
Project Financing Structure 
BP Amoco plc
(D/V=30%)
Partner A Partner B Business Treasury




























Source: Esty (2004), p.142.  
 
Before investing $1 billion into oil field development BP Amoco had firstly 
analysed what type of structure to use and what the benefits were of using the 
project finance model instead of the traditional model.  In the first diagram the 
corporate finance model is shown and in the second – the project finance model. 
The key difference between project and corporate financing is found in their 
contrasting organisational structures. Project financing involves a separate legal 
incorporation (special purpose vehicle), which allows asset securitization and 
risk localization within the project. By contrast, in corporate financing the 
project is financed within the company, in a portfolio with other company 
projects and the repayment of funds (debt or equity) is drawn from the cash 
flows of all the company’s projects. In corporate financing, the risks lie with the 
company itself while in project finance the risks are borne by the lenders. 
Another important feature of project financing is its limited or non-recourse 
basis, which enables sponsors to be not responsible for debt service in case of 
project failure. Moreover, project financing uses off-balance sheet accounting, 
which does not affect the project company’s financial standing, whereas in 
traditional financing debts are reflected on the balance sheet damaging its 
creditworthiness. Capital structure in project finance also differs from traditional 
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financing. In project financing, the company may have very high gearing (debt-
to-equity ratio) compared to public corporations. According to Esty’s study 
(2003), the average company project has a book value debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio of 70% compared to 30% for similar-sized corporations. 
However only a few project companies have a gearing lower than 50%, while 
30% of public corporations have a gearing less than 5%. 
Other characteristic features of project financing are summarised in the next 
section focusing on the advantages of project financing. 
3.6  Advantages and disadvantages of Project Finance 
Project finance is particularly beneficial for capital intensive projects such as 
power generation, telecommunications, infrastructure and oil and gas projects. 
Milbank et al (1996) summarised the advantages of project finance: 
1. It provides financing on a limited or non-recourse basis, where 
sponsors are relieved from their contractual obligations to service the debt 
in case of the project’s default.  
2. Project finance allows higher gearing than traditional corporate lending. 
In corporate borrowing, the risks and activities of a borrower are located in 
one portfolio and risks are not linked to a particular project. This can 
impact on the debt capacity of the borrower. In project finance, risks are 
isolated in a specific project and cash flow is analysed with regard to that 
project. High gearing can reduce the cost of capital by lower costs of 
borrowing compared to the cost of equity, tax-deductible interest 
compared to taxable returns on equity. 
3. Project finance uses off-balance sheet accounting of project debt. This 
permits sponsors to undertake projects without damaging their 
creditworthiness or causing restrictions on borrowing or other financial 
covenants such as debt-to-equity ratio or debt-to capitalisation ratio. 
4. Project financing may authorise sponsors to escape restrictions under 
their contract or based on regulatory limitations. Lenders can also avoid 
possible legal restrictions with regard to borrowers to whom they are 
eligible to lend, by lending to the project company rather than to its 
sponsor. 
5. Project finance is an efficient tool for allocating risks among 
participants of the project. In corporate lending, concerns about a 
borrower’s balance sheet may result in a refusal to loan. On the other 
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hand, in project finance risks can be shifted to more credible sponsors 
through different structures. Lenders may be willing to provide a loan after 
properly measuring and defining risks, particularly for projects where the 
size and concentration of the assets in a project are so assured or where 
syndicate of banks share lender’s risks Milbank et al (1996). 
On the other hand, Milbank et al (1996) also argued that the primary 
disadvantage of project financing is its complexity. The allocation of risks and 
security in project financing requires intensive negotiating and complicated legal 
procedures. This process can be time consuming and has high transaction costs. 
Esty’s research (2003) found that creating a stand-alone project company takes 
from 6 to 18 months and involves considerably higher transaction costs than 
financing an asset on an existing balance sheet. Klein et al (1996) concluded 
that transaction costs for infrastructure projects constitute 3% to 5% of the 
total investment, but can be as high as 10% for smaller and unique or first-of-a- 
kind projects. Esty (2003) highlighted a further drawback of project financing. 
Project debt is often more expensive than corporate debt because for creditors, 
project financing is riskier than traditional financing. Spreads (promised yields) 
may be 50 to 400 basis points higher (Lewellen, 1971). In addition, based on 
the BP Amoco case study (Esty, 2004), BP Amoco’s finance team recommends 
using internal corporate funds to finance new projects except in three very 
particular circumstances: 
 
1. Mega projects: those projects that are big enough to cause harm to the 
firm’s income and debt rating. 
2. Projects in politically volatile areas: projects exposed to a high chance 
of war, strikes, sabotage, lack of property rights, expropriation or currency 
inconvertibility were suggested to use project finance as they benefited 
from outside lenders. The reason is that host governments would be less 
likely to take detrimental actions towards the project, as this would 
negatively affect access to future credit from the international financial 
community. In many high risk countries, commercial banks would not lend 
unless one of the multilateral lending agencies or Export Credit Agencies 
was involved in the deal. 
3. Joint ventures with heterogeneous partners: to manage the financial 
needs of partners with weaker credit capabilities (Esty, 2004).   
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3.7 Sources of Project Financing  
Nwachukwu (2000) notes that there are many factors affecting investors’ and 
developers’ decisions over the most appropriate source of finance for capital 
projects. The main factors include: the amount of capital required; the period 
for which the capital will be needed; the purpose in which the money will be 
used; the risks of the project; the period in which the project will be fulfilled and 
the rate of interest before and after the completion of the project. Hoffman 
(2008) classifies the key sources for project financing: banks and institutional 
lenders; the equity markets; the bond markets; Rule 144A Debt Placement 
(U.S.); investment funds; multilateral agencies and development banks; 
subordinated debt; development loans; and financing from project participants. 
Milbank et al (1996) discusses the main sources of project financing: equity, 
mezzanine financing, senior debt and capital markets. These are outlined below: 
3.7.1 Equity 
According to Milbank et al (1996) lenders usually require project sponsors to 
contribute a significant portion of the capital invested in the project. The size of 
the equity that lenders require will depend on various factors such as the nature 
of a specific project, the particular risks involved and what the finished product 
is. The typical range of lenders requirements varies between 5-25% equity 
investment but can reach a maximum of 60% in high risk projects. Requiring 
sponsors to contribute equity incentivizes sponsors to ensure the project is a 
success and reduces the pressure placed on project revenue due to debt 
servicing. Advancing capital to the project through a subscription for shares in 
the project company is a common form of equity contribution.  Shares in the 
company may be issued as equity claims (common stock) or as debt (bonds and 
other debt instruments). The former means that debts have to be paid before 
the claim holder can receive any payments based on earnings while the latter 
pays out a fixed amount of payment. Equity claims may also be structured as 
convertible debt, so that the claim holder can convert debt claims into equity. 
Alternatively to capital contributions, sponsors can make subordinated loans to 
the project company as equity or a combination of subordinated loans and 
equity. The former is advantageous compared to capital contributions from 
several angles.   
• Tax treatment: there are fewer tax consequences for repaying 
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subordinate loans compared to the repayment of capital. Interest on debt 
is also classed as tax deductible income. 
• Liquidity: debt may be more liquid than equity. 
• Control: when structured with equity kickers1 subordinated debt gives a 
project sponsor greater control over the timing of its accounting and 
therefore the tax implications. Unlike dividend payments on shares, which 
are made at the project company’s discretion, debt repayments are 
scheduled.  Also debt repayment tends to incur fewer restrictions on 
behalf of the project company compared to dividends. While companies 
are compelled to repay debt interest declaring dividends and similar 
distributions is also discretionary allowing creditors greater scope to 
control the amount and timing.  
•  Regulatory hurdles: some investors including government entities may 
be barred from owning shares of, or taking an equity position in, a project 
company. However they may also be allowed to make subordinated loans 
to the company (Milbank et al. 1996). 
 
Subordinated loans are generally unsecured and subordinated to senior lenders. 
Project sponsors rights surrounding the repayment of subordinated loans may 
also be assigned to senior lenders as collateral security. Equity is generally 
provided by project sponsors though can also be supplied by insurance 
companies who may provide subordinated debt or quasi-equity, or by 
multilateral lending agencies with the ability to make equity investments (ibid). 
3.7.2 Mezzanine Financing 
Mezzanine finance is unsecured2 debt or preference shares3 that offer a high 
return with a high risk. Mezzanine finance is ranked lower than secured debt but 
above equity (Arnold, 2008). Milbank et al (1996) suggested that mezzanine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Equity kicker (sweetener) – the attachment to a bond or other debt finance of some rights to 
participate in and benefit from a good performance, for example, to exercise an option to buy 
shares (Arnold, 2008).   
2 Unsecured – a financial claim with no collateral or any charge over the assets of the borrower 
(Arnold, 2008). 
3 Preference shares – shares that entitle the holder to a fixed rate of dividend but not guaranteed. 
Holders of preference shares precede the holders of ordinary shares, but follow bond holders and 
other lenders, in payment of dividends and return of principal (Arnold, 2008). 
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financing is typical to many project financing structures. Project financing 
structures use mezzanine financing whereby another tier of debt is added to the 
traditional mix of equity and senior debt. Lower rates of repayment makes 
mezzanine finance attractive to project sponsors and it may appeal to more risk 
averse investors as it is relatively secure and offers lower repayment rates than 
equity. It has been argued that the additional level of debt can make debt 
servicing more effective and may help secure long-term project financing by 
reducing the ratio for both equity and senior debt. Mezzanine financing sources 
can include finance companies, venture capitalists and insurance companies. 
This form of financing has become more available to companies involved in 
project financings and investment funds have been formed to specifically 
provide mezzanine financing for infrastructure projects. 
Mezzanine financing through subordinated loans may be structured with 
convertible debt, warrants and options which will allow its holder to convert the 
debt – or part of it – into capital shares in the project company. Warrants allow 
their holders an option to call on the issuer of the shares to purchase the shares 
at a premium while options permit the holder to purchase shares in the project 
company (ibid). 
According to Arnold (2008), mezzanine debt usually offers interest rates “two to 
nine percentage points more than that of senior debt” (p.436). Mezzanine 
finance is more expensive than bank borrowing, but cheaper than equity. In 
addition, it enables companies to raise large amounts of money without losing 
control on business. Unlike bank lending, mezzanine is often based on interest-
only mortgage without capital repayments until the end of the loan. Finally, 
mezzanine lenders are ready to lend against the firm’s future cash flows, rather 
than insisting on security (collateral).  
3.7.3 Senior Debt 
 
Senior debt is a debt that ranks above subordinated debt for payment of 
interest or principal (Arnold, 2008). 
The  potential to leverage equity investment against medium and long term 
debt is one of the main advantages of project financing. There are many sources 
for senior debt and the following section will examine the most common sources 
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such as commercial banks and multilateral and bilateral lending agencies. In the 
context of the general tightening of credit, particularly for emerging market 
projects, a variety of alternatives have become available for project financings 
and these will be outlined below (Milbank et al, 1996). 
3.7.3.1 Commercial banks 
 
According to Forrester (1995), due to growing competition among commercial 
banks and between commercial banks and other financial lenders to meet rising 
project finance needs, commercial banks developed new roles in executing 
advisory services; construction financing; intermediation to long-term fixed-rate 
financing; commodity, interest rate, currency risk management, working capital 
financing for international projects. 
Milbank et al (1996) noticed that commercial banks have traditionally been the 
major source of senior debt for projects largely due to their expertise in non-
recourse and limited-recourse financing in oil and gas, mineral and other 
infrastructure projects. Due to the complexity of project financing transaction 
costs are high. This means that project financing tends to be limited to larger 
and more capital intensive projects and projects with higher rates of return. This 
is because projects of this nature are more likely to be capable of absorbing 
financing costs. In the case of large loans risks are shared through commercial 
lenders syndicating loans4 with a group of banks. This process makes it possible 
to raise higher levels of debt and provides greater flexibility with regards 
currencies that loans are paid in, draw-downs and pre-payment options. Banks 
can also spread their risks through this method and syndicated loans are a 
common feature in financing projects in developing countries.  
The regulatory framework of banks in the home country impacts on the ability 
of international commercial banks to take part in projects in developing nations. 
Strategies such as debt-for-equity and debt-for-debt swaps, may be adopted to 
circumvent regulatory requirements. These obstacles that international banks 
often face increases the role of local banks, capital markets and multilateral 
agencies as major lenders to emerging market projects (ibid). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Syndicated loan – a commercial banking transaction where two or more banks participate in 
making a loan to one borrower (Esty, 2004). 
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3.7.3.2 Multilateral Lending Agencies and Export Credit Agencies 
	  
Milbank et al (1996) states that due to the risks of inherent in emerging 
markets and a reluctance on the part of commercial banks to assume those 
risks, multilateral lending agencies, area development banks and export credit 
agencies (ECA) play a key role in the development and financing of major 
projects in emerging markets. Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and regional banks like the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development 
Bank can provide equity, debt, quasi-equity and guarantees. To assure 
sponsors, suppliers and lenders some of these will also provide political risk 
insurance. The involvement of multilateral agencies also provides political risk 
protection for projects that might otherwise not be financed due to a volatile 
political or social environment. Their involvement is often critical in providing 
sufficient assurance for commercial lenders to invest and for sponsors to access 
long-term credit on acceptable terms. These institutions are dissimilar in several 
respects: in products offered and the type of financing, the levels of commercial 
risk deemed acceptable and whether they require government counter-
guarantees from the host countries.  
In many cases since multilaterals and ECAs lack the resources to meet the 
capital requirements required to develop a project independently. They will 
therefore co-finance with private lenders. Co-financing involves loans made by 
multilaterals and ECAs together with private sector loans for the same project. 
Often multiple lenders will invest in the same project. For instance, the Polar 
Lights project to develop the Ardalin oil field in Siberia, was sponsored jointly by 
Conoco Inc. and Russia's Arkhangelskgeologia and financed in part by the IFC 
(US$60 million), the EBRD (US$9O million) and OPIC (US$50 million). There are 
disadvantages with loaning from multilaterals however, including a lengthy 
approval process (and the prospect of delay), restrictions on the loan currency 
and potentially currency risks (ibid).  
3.7.3.3 Public market debt offerings 
Milbank et al (1996) noted that projects have long attempted to gain access to 
the public bond and commercial paper markets. In emerging markets capital 
	  
	  
	   26	  
markets have grown significantly with the result that projects   increasingly seek 
to raise money locally. However, markets also have to contend with frequently 
overly bureaucratic regulations and regulatory bodies. The advantages of 
project financing in public debt markets include: (i) access to a wider range of 
buyers, (ii) less restrictive covenants than in the private market, and (iii) 
longer- term fixed rate debt. Particularly during the construction phase an 
important consideration for public market financing is the inflexibility of such 
financing. Structuring a project financed for the public market also requires 
attention to possible contingencies. In private market deals lenders generally 
have a higher level of expertise and better equipped to deal with the complex 
problems that may arise and often monitor a project with an independent 
engineer. Bank lenders also play an important role in the construction phase, 
giving consent and waivers to borrowers as they address unanticipated issues. 
By contrast in capital markets it is often more difficult for sponsors to obtain 
waivers or to amend agreements, measures that are sometimes necessary 
during the construction phase of a complex project (ibid). 
Forrester (1995) suggests that from a project sponsor’s perspective due to its 
high volatility capital markets are not reliable source of project finance 
compared to commercial banks. Such volatility can have adverse effect on 
projects in emerging markets. In addition, capital markets are not responsive to 
project financing during construction due to the following reasons: 
1. Investors cannot price the construction risk properly. 
2. The project will cause negative arbitrage on funds raised in foreseeing of 
construction expenses that were not yet occurred. This may result in a 
financial penalty, depending on the construction timetable, scheduled 
project draws, and the difference between interest paid to investors and 
interest earned on funds invested. 
3. Technically, it is difficult to provide investor protection simultaneously 
with adequate flexibility to deal with unexpected events. 
However, for successfully completed projects the international capital markets 
are an attractive source of permanent long-term fixed-rate financing (ibid).  
3.8 Risks and Financial Considerations in Project Finance 
Milbank et al (1996) identifies three categories of risks which should be 
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considered in project financing: in the credit extension stage, for example, it is 
credit risk; during  the development of the project there is engineering, 
development and construction risks and during the operation of the project 
there are start-up and operations risks. Project financing may also be exposed 
to regulatory risks such as taxation and risks to the environment while risks 
generally associated with international business transactions tend to be 
commercial, political, force majeure, and legal risks. 
Ruster (1996) identifies two groups of risks: during the construction period and 
operating period. The main techniques for mitigating risk during construction 
period are contractual arrangements and associated guarantees, contingency 
funds and credit lines, and private insurance. The construction contract allocates 
responsibilities between the project sponsor and construction companies. 
Contingency funds usually constitute 5%-15% of construction budget  to cover 
unexpected increase of expenditures. Contingent lines may be provided by 
third-party contractors, standby letters of credit, or sponsor guarantees. 
Usually, several types of insurance may be applied to a project. For example, 
Construction All Risks Insurance protects against property damage and useful 
from the beginning of construction to performance testing. The instruments that 
can mitigate risks  during the operating stage are contractual arrangements, 
contingency reserves, cash traps, insurance, and risk compensation devices. 
The most common structures that can be used to mitigate operating risks are 
take-or-pay, put-or-pay, pass-through contracts.  
Delori and Virji (1995) stated that for emerging markets there are three types 
of risk that are crucial and need to be hedged: interest rate, currency and 
commodity risks. Changes in commodity prices, currency and interest rates 
have remarkable implications in estimating the future cash flows, project’s 
profitability and credit worthiness. Therefore, a well-defined hedging strategy 
should be undertaken.  
In order to make a decision about the financing of the project, all the project’s 
potential risks should be considered as they can seriously impact  the project. 
Thus, choosing the appropriate way of financing can mitigate those risks. 
As project financing can have very high gearing, a financial feasibility study 
should be undertaken prior to the investment decision. Debt service coverage is 
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one of the most important considerations in project finance. The debt service 
coverage ratio shows how much cash is available to pay interest and the 
principal debt. Project earnings must be sufficient to service debt, provide 
necessary cash, pay operating expenditures and provide adequate protection for 
contingencies. In the feasibility study the assumptions must be realistic, models 
and matrices must be produced using different assumptions, including worst-
case scenarios and contingency plans. The feasibility study should incorporate 
all of the project risks. The occurrence of an actual or projected cost overrun 
may cause a default under the loan agreement or else trigger the applicable 
cost overrun undertakings (Milbank et al, 1996). 
3.9 Some Evidence on Project Performance 
Esty (2002) concludes that large projects do not generate high financial nor 
operating rates. Industrial projects such as the Eurotunnel ($15 billion), Euro 
Disney, Enron’s Dabhol power plant ($3 billion), Iridium ($5.5 billion), ICO 
Communications, Global Crossing (the Atlantic Crossing and Pacific Crossing 
Cables), Globalstar, and Murrin (an Australian nickel mine), as well as real 
estate projects like the Millennium Dome and Canary Wharf in London, have all 
faced financial hardships or been restructured. The key features of project 
performance can be summarised in the following: high construction costs, 
delays in project completion, lower returns to capital providers, poor financial 
performance.  According to the Merrow et al (1988) research, only 4 projects 
(9%) out of 47 executed their projects according to budget. The total cost 
overrun constituted $30 billion, which is 88% from the projected costs. For large 
projects massive cost growth is the rule rather the exception (Fox, 1984). The 
study of International Finance Corporation (IFC) (1996) concluded that projects 
financed with private funds have better results in project completion than that 
of public funded. Schedule overruns in privately funded projects averaged 5.3 
months (22%) on project with construction periods averaging 29.2 months. 
Whereas, projects financed with public funds averaged 54%-68% time overruns 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). With regard to returns on projects, the IFC study 
revealed that the actual rate of return on its projects was almost half of 
projected rate of return. Another research of IFC concluded that the average 
projected return in 347 projects completed during 1978-1995 was 19%, 
whereas, the actual rate decreased to 12%. According to Miller and Lessard 
(2000), 40% out of 60 large engineering projects, whose average size of 
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investment was $1 billion, had poor financial performance and were either 
abandoned totally or restricted experiencing financial distress.  
Based on the abovementioned evidence the conclusion is that large projects 
seem to experience remarkable cost and time overruns. These problems may 
significantly reduce equity returns; cause default and, potentially, serious losses 
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4 Case studies 
4.1 Financing Eurotunnel 
To demonstrate how large infrastructure projects can be financed and what 
consequences erroneous estimations and assumptions can cause the example of 
the Eurotunnel project will be assessed based on the project report by Dr. N. 
Ahuja and P. Singh. In 1986, according to the treaty signed between British and 
French governments, The Channel Tunnel Group (CTG) from the UK and France 
Manche (FM) from France were authorised to construct and operate the 
Eurotunnel System. CTG-FM was presented by leading UK and French banks and 
largest construction companies (Figure 3).  
Figure 3:  Promoters and Founder Shareholders of Eurotunnel System 
1 Construction companies 
    
1.1 Five UK companies (TransLink) 
1.2 Five French companies (TransManche)5 
    
2 Banks (Arranging Eurotunnel Credit) 
    
2.1 Two UK banks: 
  Midland 
  NatWest 
    
2.2 Tree French banks: 
  Credit Lyonais 
  Banque Nationale de Paris 
  Banque Indosuez 
 
Source: Grant, M. (1997). Financing Eurotunnel. 
CTG-FM provided £50 million in seed capital (referred to as “Equity Offering I”). 
The Concession gave CTG-FM the right to build and operate the Eurotunnel 
System for 55 years from the date the treaty was ratified. At the end of the 
Concession, in 2042, the British and French governments would assume 
ownership of the Eurotunnel System. The Eurotunnel System would comprise of 
a rail tunnel under the English Channel connecting Britain and France. The 
estimated total cost of the project was £4.8 billion. To cover these expenses and 
possible cost overruns, Eurotunnel planned to raise £6 billion. £1 billion was 
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supposed to be funded by equity and £5 billion through loans. To cope with the 
difficult task of raising this amount of funds, Eurotunnel planned to raise the 
funds in stages: 
1. The arranging banks received 33 letters of intent to underwrite loans of 
around £3.4 billion before the Eurotunnel Project’s selection by the British and 
French governments. 
2. The founding shareholders contributed equity of £50 million to CTG-FM after 
the Eurotunnel Project’s selection in January 1986 (constituting Equity Offering 
I). 
3. The Arranging Banks then increased the underwriting syndicate to 40 banks 
in the spring of 1986 and formalised their lending obligations in a collective 
commitment to underwrite a £5 billion syndicated loan. After the construction 
contract had been concluded the arranging banks planned to complete 
syndication. 
4. Eurotunnel planned a second issue of shares (Equity Offering II) in June 1986 
hoping that the issue would raise an extra £150–£250 million. 
5. Following this the £5 billion project loan would be syndicated and enter the 
underwriting agreement. Drawdowns would be refused until a total of £1 billion 
of equity had been raised with a minimum of £700 earmarked for investment in 
the Eurotunnel Project. 
6. The balance of the £1 billion of equity was planned to be raised in the Equity 
Offering planned for the first six months of 1987. 79% of Eurotunnel’s total 
costs were estimated to consist of capital charges (interest and depreciation). 
Capital charges as a proportion of total costs would decline steadily thereafter. 
Eurotunnel expected that, after completion risk had been eliminated, it would be 
able to refinance much of the project debt with cheaper financing, which would 
further reduce the debt service burden (Ahuja & Singh). 
Consequently, due to the mistaken estimates of the project’s costs and delays in 
project construction the actual expenses doubled from £4.8 billion to £9.5 billion 
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Figure 4:  The Final Financing Scheme of the Eurotunnel Project 
Equity Issues 
    £ million Timing 
Equity 1 
Founder 
Shareholders 47 September 1986 
Equity 2 
Private Institutional 
placement 206 October 1986 
Equity 3 Public Issue 770 November 1987 
Equity 4 Rights Issue 566 November 1990 
Equity 5 Rights Issue 793 May 1994 
Units issued to Bombardier (ESCW 
Settlement)6 
  35 June 1994 
Exercise of Warrants and Options 
  17 June 1994 
  




Potential Additional Equity    Final Exercise Date 
Founder Warrants (Underwritten in 
1994) 48 June 1995 
1993 Warrants (Issued to Unit 
holders) 158 October 1995 
1992 Warrants (Issued to 
Underwriting Banks) 25 March 2000 
Bank Warrants 37 March 2000 
Source: Grant, M. (1997). Financing Eurotunnel 
Debt Structure 
    £ million 
1  Junior Credit facilities 6,800 
  (Advances and letters of Credit)   
      
2 Parallel Loans    
  European Investment Bank 300 
  ECSC 200 
      
3 Senior Credit Facilities (Advances) 647 
      
4 Co-Financing Facilities7   
  European Investment Bank 1,000 
  Credit National 200 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 - ESCW – Eurotunnel Consortium Wagon Group led by Bombardier 
7 - Co-financing facilities are secured by Letters of Credit under the Junior Credit facilities. They 
are not additional funds but provide Eurotunnel access to long-term fixed rate funding. 
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Source: Grant, M. (1997). Financing Eurotunnel 
The Eurotunnel Project illustrates one way of financing large projects and 
demonstrates the overrun and economic risks that accompany large, ambitious 
transportation projects. This is particularly so when there is competition from 
other forms of transport in this case, ferries—whose operators may reduce fares 
in order to compete. The Eurotunnel Project highlights the financial problems 
that can accompany high leverage. Despite its financial difficulties since 
Eurotunnel began operating the European financial community generally felt 
that the Eurotunnel Project was viable and would continue. However, Eurotunnel 
needed a financial restructuring to reduce its debt burden as subsequent events 
have proven. Ultimately from the perspective of the two governments and the 
creditor banks the Eurotunnel Project is too big—and too visible—to be allowed 
to fail (Ahuja & Singh). 
4.2 Financing Development of the Caspian Oil Fields 
To demonstrate what alternatives companies may have in choosing the 
financing structure of the project, the case of financing development of the oil 
fields in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea is presented based on Esty’s 
case study (2004). 
In 1998, the Azerbaijani International Oil Consortium (AIOC), which included 11 
oil companies  presented in Figure 5, developed oil fields in the Azerbaijani 
sector of the Caspian Sea. As of March 1999, AIOC had completed the $1.9 
billion Early Oil Project, aimed at producing 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day 
(bpd). The original planned cost of the project was $1 billion, but this grew to 
$1.9 billion due to greater than expected expenses. The next phase, Full Field 
Development Project, was estimated to have cost from $8 to $10 billion and 
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Figure 5:  Members of Azerbaijani International Oil Consortium 
N Company Country Share in AIOC Ownership 
1 BP Amoco plc UK 34.1 public 
  Amoco Corp. USA 17   
  British Petroleum UK 17.1   
2 StatOil Norway 8.6 government 
3 Turkish Petroleum Turkey 6.8 government 
4 Amerada Hess USA 1.7 public 
5 Unocal USA 10 public 
6 Exxon USA 8 public 
7 Pennzoil USA 4.8 public 
8 Ramco plc UK 2.1 public 
9 LukOil Russia 10 government 
10 Itochu Corp. Japan 3.9 public 
11 Socar Azerbaijan 10 government 
The Early Oil Project involved the development of the Chirag Field by 
reconstructing an off-shore production platform, drilling new wells, and 
constructing a 105-mile subsea pipeline to an on-shore terminal.  It also 
involved reconstruction of two export pipelines to the Black Sea – a 750-mile 
northern route to the Russian port Novorossiysk and a 550-mile western route 
to the Georgian port Supsa.  
To finance the Early Oil Project, each subsidiary was supposed to fund a certain 
proportion of the capital expenditures and receive a proportion of output 
according to its share. AIOC members incorporated special purpose subsidiaries 
as their investment vehicles and created a centralised project management by 
establishing a joint company. Six members of AIOC funded its total 48.2% 
share by using internal corporate funds. Five other members (Amoco. Exxon, 
Unocal, LUKoil, and Turkish Petroleum) formed a Mutual Interest Group (MIG) to 
obtain a project loan with the assistance of two multilateral agencies, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC – a member of World Bank Group) and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The 
multilateral agencies provided long-term funds and also assisted in mitigating 
political risks as development banks.  
In February 1999, MIG along with IFC and EBRD closed a $400 million limited-
recourse project financing with an effective interest rate of less than 10%, 
representing the spread of 350 to 400 basis points over the current six-month 
LIBOR rate. Usually, the multilaterals funded projects in one of three ways: 
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direct lending for “A Loans”8, indirect lending for a syndicated bank loan (“B 
Loans9), or equity contributions. In this case, the financing was structured in ten 
A loans and ten B loans. Each agency (IFC and EBRD) made an A and B loan to 
each of the five MIG members.   
To syndicate B loans of $200 million was not an easy task. Finally, only three 
banks commitments were received totalling just $75 million. The IFC and EBRD 
financed $150 million out of $200 million in A loans, hoping to raise the 
remainder of funds when the situation in financing the emerging markets will 
improve. 
To show what alternatives a company may have in financing the large projects, 
the example of BP Amoco (the largest member in AIOC), related to financing the 
Full Field Development Project, will be presented.  
To finance its $1 billion (34.1%*$3 billion) share for the first stage of the Full 
Field Development Project, BP Amoco had several options. It could use a dual 
financing strategy like in the Early Oil Project where half its commitment would 
come from internal funds and half from a project loan. “The advantage of this  
approach is that it gave them the best of both worlds; the disadvantage was 
that it also gave them the worst of both worlds” (Esty, 2004, p.159). 
On the other hand, BP Amoco could join some or all members of AIOC and 
arrange a project loan as it was in the Early Oil Project. This approach enabled 
BP Amoco to leverage its investment with outside funds mitigating political risks. 
The drawback of this option, given the incomplete syndication, was the long 
time required to close a deal and the cost of project debt.    
The third approach could be to finance the project by internal funds. Like all 
previous options, this one had disadvantages. For instance, being the largest 
investor and project operator, BP Amoco could make it more difficult for other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A loan – A loan from a multilateral agency such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
where it is the lender of record and where it books the loan for its own account (Esty, 2004).  
 
9 B loan – A loan syndicated by a multilateral lender, such as the IFC, that acts as the lender of 




	   36	  
AIOC members to negotiate a good deal. If weaker consortium members 
negotiate with lenders it could result in a deal that will negatively affect BP 
Amoco’s operational and managerial flexibility. Furthermore, it could cause 
adverse precedents for future financing. In addition, other AIOC partners could 
blame BP Amoco for free riding as they bore more expensive financing, while 
sharing the political risks provided by multilaterals.  Finally, the decision how to 
finance the first stage of the Full Field Development Project would impact on the 
financing of future stages (Esty, 2004).     
This example demonstrates how large projects can be financed, what kind of 
options a company may have in defining the ways of financing, and what 
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5 The case study of the KCTS project 
	  
5.1 Project Finance in Kazakhstan 
	  
The experience of Kazakhstan in project finance, as well as other countries of 
the former Soviet Union, is relatively modest. In the mid 1990s, there were 
active financing of large scale and capital intensive projects in oil and gas 
sector, such as the Kashagan and Karachaganak oil fields. In other industries, 
although there were many capital intensive projects in mineral recourses mining 
and refining, infrastructure development and modernisation of thermoelectric 
and hydroelectric power stations. Project financing was not as popular as it was 
in developed countries. According to the director of structured financing of the 
Eurasian Development Bank, the reasons for undeveloped project finance in 
Kazakhstan  lay in the following (Burnashev, 2010): 
1. Before the financial crisis of 2008-2009, macroeconomic stability and high 
prices of export products had led Kazakhstan to a surplus in the state budget, 
which allowed it to fund not only social programmes but also to invest 
considerable amounts of money to development funds. Funds were available 
for investment programs at the republic and local levels. The role of national 
development institutes, such as the Kazakhstan Development Bank has 
increased significantly. Moreover, new institutions, for example, the Eurasian 
Development Bank and the National Wealth Fund “Samruk-Kazyna” were 
successfully created.  Those activities laid the foundation for the growth of 
project financing as a tool for the fulfilment of government project priorities. 
Institutions of development in particular, play a key role in project financing 
in Kazakhstan. 
2. The beginning of the 21st century was associated with significant capital flows 
to almost all sectors of the Kazakhstan economy. Between 1998-2008, due to 
relatively cheap international funds and the openness of emerging markets, 
domestic and foreign investors invested their money in various projects, 
including those which were financed on a non-recourse basis. 
3. Many leading Kazakhstan companies have become public and their shares are 
traded on domestic and international stock markets. For such companies, 
traditional instruments of corporate financing have become available. In 
particular, by means of corporate loans many development and capacity 
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extension projects, as well as projects devoted to exploring and mining new 
mineral recourse deposits were financed. Due to its specificity and 
complexity, only a few companies used project financing. 
4. Project financing in Kazakhstan is still at the formation stage. The 
relationships between the government and business, the overall level of 
market efficiency and the relationships between economic units have not 
reached the level that they have in more developed countries. Thus, the 
legislative and legal systems are far from perfect. For project finance the level 
of the development of corporate and property rights is crucial. The efficiency 
of project finance is characterised by the overall effectiveness of judicial and 
administrative systems. Therefore, considering the above mentioned factors, 
the majority of projects were funded on the basis of mixed financing rather 
than pure project financing. 
5. Finally, the financial crisis in 2008-2009 negatively affected the execution of 
many investment programmes and forced companies to concentrate on 
simply to survive. In addition, financial institutions that traditionally were 
involved in project financing are experiencing difficult times as well.   
In general, two key features of almost all successful projects in Kazakhstan 
should be mentioned. The first is the potentially high profitability and capacity to 
generate good cash flows. Traditionally, EBITDA in such projects ranges from 
40% to 70% and above.  The second feature is having a strong sponsor who 
can successfully promote the project. Often, such sponsors can be government 
or state companies. In such cases, the sponsor’s investment to the project is 
only expressed by equity contribution and expenses for initial development of an 
asset (ibid).  
Having four years experience in project financing in Kazakhstan, the Eurasian 
Development Bank (EDB) concludes that the majority of projects are fulfilled on 
the basis of hybrid finance: the structuring of the projects are based on project 
finance but elements of corporate finance are added such as corporate 
guarantee and support of the project’s shareholders often through bank 
guarantees. That is because of the limited number of participants in the project 
and failure to reduce risks to an appropriate level for the EBD. Furthermore, due 
to complicated documentation procedures in project financing, many projects 
are rejected based on their infeasibility, low professionalism of the team 
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implementing the project and weak or unstable financial position of the sponsor 
in relation to both state and private projects.  
Despite advantages of project finance, it is not widely used in Kazakhstan, 
particularly, in large-scale joint international projects devoted to the 
development and integration of countries in the region of the former Soviet 
Union and increase of their export potential. However, this instrument could 
reduce the debt burden of the project’s sponsors, who are often state 
companies, effectively distributing it between creditors; diversifying the risks of 
major project participants and improving the efficiency of project management 
in case of its execution. 
In Kazakhstan, capital markets are not well developed and market liquidity is 
relatively low. Thus, banks heavily reliant on external borrowing. Lack of well-
functioning money and debt markets and limited domestic alternatives to raising 
long-term capital have led banks to foreign markets.  Moreover, limited high-
quality collateral for money market transactions has resulted in banks relying on 
the foreign exchange market for liquidity management. There is an absence of 
hedging mechanisms that would allow banks to manage risks 
(www.lnweb90.worldbank.org). Kazakhstani banks dependence on external 
borrowing have led to relatively high rates of lending, which have forced 
Kazakhstani companies to seek sources of finance directly from foreign 
commercial and development banks.  
5.2 Typical Structure of Project Financing Scheme in Kazakhstan 
According to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan (DBK), the typical structure 
of project financing in Kazakhstan is as follows. 
Firstly, the Kazakh government and a company, in collaboration with other 
financial institutions, establish a project company (special purpose vehicle, SPV) 
in the form of joint-stock company. Then, the project company tenders for 
construction services and delivery of necessary equipment. The project company 
negotiates the appropriate agreements and contracts. The project company 
organises a tender among foreign banks for the financial consultant and 
organiser of the financing transaction for the whole project. The DBK can act on 
behalf of the government. The SPV issues a mandate for organising the 
borrowing required for project financing. Furthermore, the SPV signs contracts 
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with various potential consumers of the project’s services rendering on 
completion of object construction under the project. The project company opens 
a special account, where receipts from the services provided are accumulated 
and from which obligations are served. 
The foreign bank (banks) jointly with DBK attracts borrowings such as secured 
Eurobonds issuing programme, credit lines or co-financing. The borrowed funds 
go to the payment for the construction services, the equipment delivery and 
other services through the SPV account. 
After object commissioning, the receipts from the consumers go to the special 
account, which is used for servicing the borrowed funds (www.kdb.kz). 
5.3 An overview of the current situation in Kazakhstan’s oil industry  
In many developing countries such as Kazakhstan, the oil and gas industries 
have extensive state involvement. However, the lack of available state 
resources and high capital needs have led governments to seek private and 
foreign investment. In order to attract foreign funds developing countries have 
reduced state regulation and adopted more transparent regulatory schemes 
while liberalising their economies. These improvements have resulted in 
increased opportunities for private domestic and foreign investors (Milbank et al, 
1996). 
The oil sector is a key industry in Kazakhstan. To maintain sustainable economic 
growth and improve the quality of life of its people the Kazakh government 
elaborated the National strategy for the development of the Caspian Sea for 
2003-2015. As a part of this strategy Kazakhstan is planning to significantly 
increase oil and gas production and to enhance the revenues of the state 
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Figure 6: Production and Export of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstan 
 
Source: Presentation of JSC NC KazMunaiGas, 2011, p.5 
The Kazakhstani sector of the Caspian Sea has large oil reserves. Based on the 
geologic-geophysical research Kazakhstan’s volume of fuel resources is 
forecasted at 8 billion tons, including oil reserves of 4.5 billion tons 
(Tolumbayev, 2011). To efficiently use existing resources the country needs 
huge investment, modern technology and highly qualified human resources. 
Therefore, work towards attracting foreign investment and technology of the 
leading world oil companies is proceeding. The country’s policy is aimed at the 
creation of a stable politic environment and economic growth with continuing 
improvement of legislation and the promotion of a prosperous investment 
climate with tax preferences. These policies have already attracted multinational 
corporations such as ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron, Agip, British Petroleum, 
Statoil, and Shell to Kazakhstan. Between 1996 and 2010, $114 billion was 
invested in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector with $15 billion allocated to geologic 
prospecting works. Annual investment grew by more than 17 times reaching 
$16 billion in 2010, including $1.5 billion for prospecting works. The volume of 
investments in exploration of the great oil fields of Kashagan reached $22 billion 
in 2010.  


































Year-on-year increase in the production and, accordingly, exports amounted to 6% on the average. 
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Nowadays, there are 201 contracts signed for subsurface management, fifteen 
of which are based on production sharing agreement. The Government of 
Kazakhstan maintains its share in all projects that take place in the territory of 
the country through the National Company KazMunaiGas. Exploration of the oil 
fields in the Caspian region is associated with technological difficulties because 
of the area’s severe climate, high proportions of sulphureted hydrogen in the oil, 
an abnormally high atmosphere pressure and ecologic sensibility of the area 
where oil fields are located. Thus, there are serious requirements for the quality 
of the equipment and innovative technologies used in oil exploration in this 
region. Oil production in Kazakhstan continues to grow rapidly. In the last 
decade, the average annual growth of oil production exceeded 10%.  The 
volume of oil and gas exports reached 71 million tons. While planning for a 
considerable growth of oil and gas production in the Caspian region there is a 
great importance attached to the development of transportation infrastructure 
to deliver hydrocarbons to the world market.  
The development of the Caspian region is being carried out in collaboration with 
neighbouring countries such as Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. The 
main export destinations for oil transportation from the Caspian region are the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (to the Black Sea, Russia), Atasu-Alashankou (to 
China), port Aktau (to Iran and Azerbaijan), and the Kazakhstan Caspian 
Transportation System (KCTS). In July 2011, the extension of Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium project began. This project will allow export of 52.5 million tons in 
2015 to the West European countries compared to the current 32.5 million tons. 
Currently, the beginning of the 2nd stage of the exploration of Kashagan oil field, 
a new oil pipeline Yeskene-Kuryk is planned. This project will be realised within 
the KCTS project and will enable transportation of oil through the Caspian Sea 
to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and then to world markets. In addition to the Yeskene-
Kuryk pipeline to facilitate the transport of oil from the biggest oil fields 
Kashagan and Tengiz to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline a Transcaspian system 
is also planned. The Transcaspian system is also a part of the KCTS project and 
includes construction of new oil terminals on both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
Caspian shores as well as purchase of additional tankers and ships and the 
creation of a connecting system to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
(Tolumbayev, 2011).  
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5.4 The KCTS project 
According to the materials provided by KMG-TransCaspiy, the aim of the KCTS 
project is to create a new combined transport system that will enable 
Kazakhstan to deliver its crude oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to 
Ceyhan (Turkey) and/or other oil transportation systems via the Republic of 
Azerbaijan to the world oil markets. The project will create a single energy 
transportation corridor from east to west running towards the Mediterranean 
Sea, avoiding the Bosporus  and Dardanelle  Straits,  with an outlet at  the 
biggest  marine oil loading terminals of the abovementioned region, such as 
the deep-sea Mediterranean port at Ceyhan. The project has a strategic 
importance as it will allow diversification of Kazakhstan export routes for oil and 
secure substantial economic benefits. The KCTS p ro j e c t  will integrate the  
Yeskene-Kuryk pipeline and  the  Transcaspian System.  
It is anticipated that a new oil loading terminal capable of receiving tankers with 
a large deadweight with a maximum of 60,000 tonnes will be built at the Kuryk 
port where it will connect the Yeskene-Kuryk pipeline to the Yeskene oil 
treatment plant. The new pipeline will be packed not only with Kashagan oil, this 
route will be used by other oil companies as well. Memorandum of Cooperation 
concerning the feasibility study between NC «KazMunauGas» JSC, JSC 
«KazTransOil» and «Total» company involves collaborative research on 
«Yeskene-Kuryk» pipeline which resulted in signing of a Declaration of 
intentions. 
The 750 km Yeskene-Kuryk pipeline will transport 23 million tones of oil 
annually with the potential of carrying between 35 and 56 million tons per year 
in the future.  The Presidents of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan signed an 
Agreement concerning oil transportation from Kazakhstan via the Caspian sea 
and Azerbaijan to international markets though the «Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan» 
pipeline in 1996. Following the Agreement’s provisions, a Trans-Caspian oil 
transportation system will be created which will construct a large-capacity 
tanker fleet and reception capacities in Azerbaijan which will connect with the 
«Baku-Ceyhan» pipeline. 
The significance of this new transportation system in the global market for 
energy is that it will allow Kazakhstan oil companies to consider new directions 
of deliveries and will provide access to deep-water port Ceyhan round about 
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Turkish straits Bosporus and Dardanelles. This perspective provides an 
economically beneficial access to distant oil markets, such as America and 
South-Eastern Asia countries. As a way of development of this direction, it is 
planned to supply oil from Kashagan field, and from other fields of the Caspian 
shelf and Western Kazakhstan. From the port at Kuryk oil can be delivered in 
other directions, including Baku-Batumi and to Iran (www.kmg.kz). 
The members of the KCTS project are the Kazakhstan National Company 
KazMunaiGas (KMG) and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic 
(SOCAR). The main legislative basis for the project is a Treaty dated 16th June 
2006 between the  Republics  of Kazakhstan  and  Azerbaijan  to facilitate and 
support the transportation of petroleum from Kazakhstan across the Caspian 
Sea and the territory of Azerbaijan  to international markets through the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan system; a Memorandum  of  Understanding  on 
Cooperation  Principles  among  KCTS Project Participants  dated January 24th 
2007 and other intergovernmental agreements and international 
declarations related to relevant issues (Amended and Restated 
Memorandum of Understanding: KCTS Cooperation Principles, 2008).  
The KCTS is designed to transport crude oil mainly from a new Kashagan oil 
field and the existing Tengiz field. That makes the KCTS project dependent on 
the start of the Kashagan oil production. The Kashagan oil field is being 
developed in accordance with the Production Sharing Agreement in respect of the 
North Caspian Sea (NCS PSA) dated November 18th 1997. Initially, the shares of 
the partners of the Kashagan oil field were distributed as following: Eni 
(18.52%), KMG Kashagan BV (8.33%), ExxonMobil (18.52%), Shell (18.52%), 
Total (18.52%), ConocoPhillips (9.26 %) and lnpex (8.33%). In 2001, ENI was 
appointed as operator of the project by the NCS PSA partners (ibid). 
Taking into account the fact that ENI, ConocoPhillips, lnpex and Total are NCS 
PSA partners and have a 15% share in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, 
together with Chevron (8,9%) which is a Tengiz partner, the creation of the 
KCTS is considered as a most promising course of action. 
5.5 The Kashagan Oil Field 
The Kashagan oil field was discovered in 2000. According to NK KazMunaiGaz 
data, the reserves of crude oil in Kashagan oil deposit constitute 4,850 million 
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tonnes while recoverable reserves are 1,475.5 million tonnes. The period of 
development will last until 2041 and initially oil production from the Kashagan 
field was intended to have included three phases (www.kmg.kz): 
Phase 1: 2002 to 2010. Initiation of development: pilot development of the 
eastern part of the Kashagan field beginning in 2008, an increase in 
production levels to 21 million tons of oil annually (450 thousand barrels/day). 
Phase 2:  2010 to 2014. Extension of the developed zone, further increases in 
production levels to 42 million tonnes of oil per year (900 thousand 
barrels/day) from the Kash.agan field. 
Phase 3: 2015 to 2041. Further extension of the developed zone, ramping-up 
p r o d u c t i o n  to the maximum level of 56 million tonnes of oil per year (1200 
thousand barrels/day). 
Currently, the Kazakhstan government and NCS PSA Contracting Companies 
are in the process of drafting amendments concerning the realisation of the 
Kashagan field. The delay is caused by the dispute between the authorised 
organisation (NC KazMunaiGas) and NCS Consortium. The contractor submitted 
Amendment N3 and the budget for the government’s consideration in June 
2007. The amendment suggested a rise in planned spending from $57 to $136 
billion; further delay in the oil mining schedule from 2008 to 2010 and also a 
restructuring of infrastructural development in the sea section. Delay was a 
result of the initial design failing to meet international standards for operating 
personnel safety concerning possible spills of toxic hydrogen sulphate. Originally 
the authorised organisation was not in agreement with Amendment N3 to 
KDPBA and this dispute led to negotiations continuing between July 2007 and 
October 2008. On October 31, 2008 the authorized organisation and NCS 
consortium signed the second supplementary NCP agreement that stated the 
following: 
1. Share: NC «KazMunayGas» JSC through its subsidiary «KMG Kashagan 
B.V» would raise its share till it was equivalent to the level of major 
shareholders – from 8.33% to 16.81%. 
2. Additional payments: Priority share paid by the NCS consortium to the 
Republic of Kazakhstan (from 3.5% to 12.5% with oil price from $45 to 
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$195). Including profits from the share increase the total received by 
Kazakhstan would be $7.2 US billion in NPV values (at the discount rate 
10%). This was equivalent to $71 billion in non-discountable cash flows at 
the price of $85 per barrel. If the price of oil rose to $125 per barrel, the 
amount of compensation would increase to $13.7 billion. 
3. Concerning project budget and schedule control: firstly if commercial 
oil production failed to commence before October 1, 2013, consortium 
expenditure would not be compensated; b) there would be no 
compensation for additional expenditures regarding phases 1+2 in addition 
to the agreed budget in case of future changes in the volume of work prior 
to commercial oil production. 
4. Penal sanctions: if commercial oil production was delayed after 2008 
the penalty would rise from $50 to $120 million per year in 2012. 
5. Decrease of interest rate charged on capital investment (uplift) from 
LIBOR + 3% to LIBOR+2.5%. 
6. Transition to New Operation Model: a new joint company would be 
formed to improve the efficiency of the project’s management and 
strengthen the role of «KazMunaiGas». 
7. «Ship or pay»: In exchange for ‘Ship or Pay’ terms for contracting 
companies they would receive a reasonable, non-discriminatory rate and 
mutually agreed stability guarantees (www.kmg.kz). 
Disagreements between participants of the Kashagan project resulted in delay 
of the second phase from 2014 to 2018 and a corresponding postponement of 
the third phase. 
5.6 Cash flow of the Yeskene-Kuryk project 
The cash flow provided by KMG-TransCaspiy company is related to the first part 
of the KCTS project, the Yeskene-Kuryk pipeline construction. The cash flow has 
different assumptions and four scenarios. The first two scenarios are based on 
different volumes of oil transportation and assume a certain level of capital and 
operational expenditure. A further two scenarios are based on different levels of 
debt financing. All scenarios include the possibility of delay of the second phase 
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of the Kashagan field till 2018. Thus, the main stream of revenues will start in 
2018. The tariff for oil transportation is calculated based on the methodology of 
the monopoly regulator of Kazakhstan as, according to Kazakhstan legislation, 
oil transportation is treated as a natural monopoly. The period of cash flow 
projections is 33 years from 2009 to 2042. The data in the cash flow does not 
include 12% VAT.  
The main assumptions of the financial model are presented in the Figure 7. The 
detailed financial model with four scenarios is presented in Appendix 1. 
Figure 7:  General assumptions for the Yeskene-Kuryk cash flow 
 
Discounting rate 11.50% 
WACC 11.26% 
Financing rate in Kazakhstan (the rate 
of National Bank financing) 
7% 
Financing rate in the USA 0.25% 
Inflation in Kazakhstan (tenge) 4% 
Inflation in the USA (US dollar) 2% 
Corporate tax 20% 
VAT 12% 
Financing rate 7.32% 
Credit period 10 years 
Period of grace  3 years 
Dividend payments in the first 5 years 0 
Scenarios 
1. The first scenario is based on the assumption that the maximum 
volume of transportation will be 56 million tonnes per year and the project 
will be financed 100% by debt. The detailed plan of transportation volumes 
is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: The Projected Volumes of Oil Transportation for the KCTS 
Project for 2014-2023 
Million tonnes 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
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2. The second scenario is based on the assumption of maximum oil 
production of 80 million tonnes per year; the project will be financed by 
100% debt.  
3. The third scenario is calculated on the assumption of 75% debt 
financing and 25% equity financing; the volume of transportation is 
realistic at 56 million tonnes per year. 
4. The fourth scenario is calculated based on 75% debt financing, 25% 
equity financing and the volume of transportation at 80 million tonnes per 
year. 
Scenario 1: 56 million tonnes per years, 100% debt 
Total capital expenditures $2.7 billion 
NPV $231 million 
IRR 21% 
Discounted payback period 17 years 
Payback period 14 years 
In the first scenario, the project starts to generate cash flow only from 2024 
after 14 years of the project when the principal payments will become lower. 
The accumulated discounted cash flow of the project becomes positive only in 
2027, after 17 years. The total NPV of the project according to the first scenario 
is $231 million and IRR is 21%. 
Scenario 2: 80 million tonnes per year, 100% debt 
Total capital expenditures $3.4 billion 
NPV $291 million 
IRR 21% 
Discounted payback period 17 years 
Payback period 15 years 
In the second scenario, although the volume of transportation is increased to 80 
million tonnes per year, it does not have a significant effect on the cash flow and 
increases NPV by only $60 million. That is because the capacity extension 
requires an additional $700 million, increasing capital expenditures from $2.7 to 
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$3.4 billion. The Internal Rate of return remains the same as in the first 
scenario.  
Scenario 3: 75% debt financing, 25% equity financing,                          
56 million tonnes per year 
Total capital expenditures $2.7 billion 
NPV $165 million 
IRR 14% 
Discounted payback period 21 years 
Payback period 11 years 
In the third scenario, the decrease of debt financing to 75% has negatively 
affected the project’s outcome by lowering the project’s NPV to $165 million, 
decreasing IRR by 7%, and lengthening the discounted payback period by 4 
years. That is attributed to the fact that debt financing is cheaper than equity 
financing due to a higher rate of return on equity. 
Scenario 4: 75% debt financing, 25% equity financing,                          
80 million tonnes per year 
Total capital expenditures $3.4 billion 
NPV $213 million 
IRR 14% 
Discounted payback period 20 years 
Payback period 12 years 
In the fourth scenario, compared to the second scenario with the same volume 
of transportation but a higher proportion of debt, NPV decreased by $78 million, 
IRR fell by 7% and the discounted payback period became 3 years longer. In 
general, all scenarios demonstrated relatively low NPV compared to the amount 
invested in the project and the long payback period. Low volumes of oil 
transportation in the early years (2014-2017) and the necessity of maintaining a 
competitive tariff leads to a deficit of funds for debt service and the necessity of 
attracting an additional funds of $1.5 billion. 
	  
	  
	   50	  
5.7 Proposed financing structure of the Yeskene-Kuryk project 
The projected cash flow provided by the KMG-TransCaspiy company is based on 
one of a range of possible financing structures which has been negotiated with 
lenders. The total amount of the Yeskene-Kuryk project is $2.7 billion (excluding 
VAT). The amount of equity to be raised is $0.5 billion, while debt financing is 
estimated at $2.2 billion.  Debt finances are planned to be provided by three 
financial institutions: COFACE, Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) 
and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI).  COFACE was initially 
founded as the French export credit agency and was later privatised by the 
government continuing as a commercial enterprise. COFACE is a part of the 
corporate, investment and financial services arm of Group BPCE of the Natixis 
group the second largest banking player in France. The main business of 
COFACE is trade receivables protection, finance and management and credit 
insurance (www.coface.com).  
JBIC is the international branch of Japan Finance Corporation and provides 
policy-based finance with a mission to contribute to the sound development of 
the Japanese and international economy (www.jbic.go.jp). Nexi supports 
investments and loans for overseas business through cooperation with JBIC, 
particularly medium and long-term export finance for developing countries in 
cooperation with JBIC and Japanese commercial banks. NEXI also insures the 
loan funded by commercial banks (www.nexi.go.jp). 
Main characteristics of proposed financing: 
Lender: sponsor company NC KazMunaiGas. 
The amount of the contract: up to $2.5 billion or equivalent in euro. 
Period of credit: 13 years (period of construction – 3 years, period of repayment 
– 10 years). 
Effective rate of return: 7.3%. 
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Financing structure and major conditions: 
COFACE: 
The amount financing: $1.321 billion.  
The share of financing: 85% of commercial contracts amount. 
Fixed rate (based on Commercial Interest Reference Rate): EURIBOR CIRR 
(4.34%) + interest margin 0.65% ≈ 4.99%. 
Adjustable rate: 6 months EURIBOR (0.964%) + interest margin 1.40% ≈ 
2.36%. 
Default fee: 2%. 
Commitment fee: 0.50%. 
Arrangement fee: 0.60%. 
Bank charges: 1%. 
COFACE premium: 12.18%. 
JBIC: 
The amount financing: $0.528 billion.  
The share of financing: up to 85% of commercial contracts amount. 
Interest rate: 2.3%. 
Commitment fee: 0.50%. 
Arrangement fee: 0.60%. 
Bank charges: 1%. 
JBIC premium: 12.18%. 
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NEXI: 
The amount of co-financing: $0.352 billion.  
Interest rate: 4.2%. 
- in case of the early payment option: 6 months LIBOR (0.388%) + 
interest margin 1.60% ≈ 1.989% 
- in case of scheduled payments: 6 months LIBOR (0.388%) + interest rate 
1.65% ≈ 2.04%. 
Commitment fee: 0.50%. 
Arrangement fee: 0.60%. 
Bank charges: 1%. 
NEXI premium: 12.18%. 
Problematic issues in the proposed scheme: 
• According to the terms of COFACE, NC KazMunaiGas but not KMG-
TransCaspiy should receive the loan, while NC KazMunaiGas’s position is 
that the project company KMG-TransCaspiy should receive the loan with 
KazMunaiGas’ corporate guarantee. 
• COFACE does not want to agree with the NC KazMunaiGas’ proposal to 
substitute the corporate guarantee of NC KazMunaiGas on to shippers’ 
liabilities “ship or pay” in the future (Presentation of KMG-TransCaspiy, 
2010). 
5.8 Risks, considerations and recommendations for the KCTS project 
	  
5.8.1 Financial risks 
According to the indicative cash flow of the Yeskene-Kuryk project presented by 
KMG-TransCaspiy company the project contains the following financial risks.  
Firstly, the project revenues do not allow proper debt servicing. High principal 
and interest payments on debt lead to a deficit of cash and necessity to attract 
additional funds to cover the deficit. This can potentially result in a situation 
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where the company is unable to service its debt. Moreover, there are no funds 
for any contingencies. It is important that project revenues must be sufficient to 
service debt, provide needed cash, pay operating expenses and provide 
adequate protection for contingencies. 
The second consideration is the feasibility of the financial model, particularly its 
assumptions and scenarios. It is crucial that input data for cash flow projections, 
including revenue forecast, capital and operational expenses, inflation, interest 
rates and the period of construction should be realistic and carefully considered. 
Scenario analysis should include the worst-case scenario and contingency plans. 
Furthermore, the actual capital and operational costs might be considerably 
higher than forecasted (as it was in Eurotunnel example), which can result in 
significant cost overruns. This may lead to additional borrowing while the 
revenues of the project might be insufficient to cover the debt. If the project 
costs are higher than projected in provided cash flow, there is no extra capacity 
for additional borrowing repayment. Such situation may result in default of the 
project. Moreover, there are no reserves of funds in case of force majeure. If 
force majeure occurs during construction it may adversely affect the project 
causing massive additional investments and the delay of commercial production. 
This may result in project default in cases where the company does not have 
adequate reserves of cash or contingency plans. 
5.8.2 Engineering and construction risks 
One of the key issues of the project is completion on time. If the project is not 
implemented according to the schedule it might detrimentally affect the 
outcome including future cash flows. Delay in completion leads, at best, to 
additional interest expense and lengthening of the repayment profile (Milbank et 
al, 1996). Large projects such as KCTS often have complexities in construction, 
design and engineering. In addition, during the construction process delays in 
the supply of materials and problems with suppliers and contractors may occur. 
Therefore, the selection and use of proven technologies, strong construction 
contracts and guarantees as well as the use of qualified and creditworthy 
contractors may be vital for the project execution. 
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5.8.3 Commercial risk 
In project finance the debt service is fulfilled from that particular project’s 
revenues. Therefore, it is important that the project must be conducted properly 
and efficiently in order to ensure that the projected output is achieved. 
Therefore, offtake agreements10 or “ship or pay” contracts with contractors can 
be very helpful in guaranteeing cash flows. A default by the offtaker11 will cause 
a loss of income, which, in turn will result in a default in debt payment and 
other obligations of the project company necessitating the interruption of 
operations (Milbank et al, 1996).  
Furthermore, as the major oil supplier for transportation to KCTS is Kashagan oil 
field, the revenues of KCTS will strongly depend on that oil field. In particular, 
the delay of commercial production in Kashagan will adversely affect the KCTS 
revenues. Thus, all the risks of the Kashagan project may be attributed to the 
KCTS project and the construction of KCTS is feasible only when Kashagan 
produces considerable quantities of oil sufficient to generate enough revenue for 
KCTS to service the debt. 
5.8.4  Currency risk 
According to Milbank et al (1996), projects that generate revenues in one 
currency, but which are financed by obligations payable in another currency are 
exposed to currency risk. Currency risk occurs from the use of multiple 
currencies (devaluation or parity risk), the need to obtain specified currencies 
(availability or conversion risk) and the need to move specified currencies 
(repatriation risk). Considerable devaluation of a local currency will impair the 
project's ability to repay the debt in another currency unless a corresponding 
increase in income is made. Traditionally this occurs through price increases. 
Therefore, even if a project is generating cash flow in the local currency exactly 
as planned, the value of such a currency when converted into dollars for 
example may be insufficient to service the debt due to devaluation of the local 
currency. As for conversion risk, exchange controls restricting or prohibiting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Offtake agreement – an agreement to purchase all or a substantial part of the product 
produced by a project, which typically provides the revenue stream for a project financing (Esty, 
2004, p.531). 
11 Offtaker (Offtake purchaser) – the purchaser of a project’s output (Esty, 2004, p.531).  
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conversion from local currencies may impair repayment of the project's debt. 
Furthermore, local market limitations on currency availability could impair the 
ability to convert money to a specified currency, affecting the debt repayment 
capacity. To mitigate currency risks the following measures can be implied: 
indexing local currency revenues to dollar equivalents; special deposit accounts 
(including offshore dollar accounts); frequent conversions; exchange 
agreements; currency hedges and currency reserve accounts (Milbank et al, 
1996). 
5.8.5 Political risk 
Projects in developing countries may be exposed to political risk.  Political risk 
assessment involves the possibility of a sudden change in the system of 
government for instance through changes in the status of individual leaders or 
parties. The results of sudden changes in the political system may cause 
expropriation, nationalisation, confiscation of assets and political violence 
(Milbank et al, 1996). Higher political risk of a country should result in a larger 
proportion of project finance loans among all syndicated loans (Hainz and 
Kleimeier, 2004). As KCTS involves a joint venture between two countries 
(Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), the KCTS project bares the political risks of those 
countries. Moreover, the political situation in other neighboring countries 
(Russia) and also diplomatic relationships with them can impact on the 
realisation of the KCTS project. In addition, the KCTS project is linked with the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which makes it vulnerable to the political risks in 
Turkey and Georgia and to diplomatic relationships of Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan with those countries.   
 As large projects such as KCTS require huge capital investment the payout 
from the project would likely to come after 6 to 10 years (Milbank et al, 1996). 
Therefore, the investing company would not create economic value until late in 
the first decade or even in the second. For that reason, political risk 
assessments should be targeted at predicting expected political risks to the 
project’s revenues for 10 years or more into the future. The problem is that 
such predictions are rarely reliable particularly in politically volatile regions 
distinguished by political, ethnic and/or religious divisions (Milbank et al, 1996). 
To mitigate political risks the following measures can be important: ensuring 
extensive participation of the partner-country in the project including a 
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multilateral agency in the financing or ensuring that the syndicate of lenders is 
drawn from a wide range of countries. Treaties between partners may also 
substantially reduce political risk providing non-discriminatory treatment and 
protection against expropriation.  
5.8.6 Structuring considerations 
5.8.6.1 Project interconnections 
	  
It is anticipated that the KCTS project will be related to other projects such as 
the Kashagan and Tengiz oil fields; onshore Kazakh pipelines and export 
infrastructure from Baku (Azerbaijan). However this raises the following issues:  
• Is the KCTS project intended as a standalone project and what is the 
extent of interrelations with other assets in Kazakhstan or the Caspian 
region? 
• Whether KCTS is solely assigned for Kashagan and Tengiz oil or whether 
access for other companies will be available? 
• Will the project generate projects if organised as a standalone project? 
• How would ownership differ from that of related infrastructure assets? 
• How would the allocation of capacity rights and economic rent between 
the various segments be organized for the management and control of 
the integrated transportation system? 
Answers to these questions will affect the economics of the project and its 
ability to raise limited resource debt. 
5.8.6.2 Risk allocation 
	  
It is vital that there is a suitable allocation of risk between the various projects 
and infrastructure assets and between sponsors and lenders of the project and 
the following issues need to be decided. 
• Who will carry the completion risk for each of the projects; 
• How the risk of postponement in one particular project impacts on the 
completion of other projects; 
• The manner in which different risks would affect the cash flow of the 
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Various issues need to be addressed including construction delay and overrun; 
operational issues; the shipping of lower volumes of oil due to upstream 
interruptions and operational issues with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. 
Another factor to be considered is political events leading to interruption of 
production and transportation. The subsequent KCTS transportation agreement 
should reflect the agreed risk allocation and allow producers and sponsors to 
adopt a produce-and-pay structure or a ship-or-pay structure. In addition, 
payment adjustments may mitigate risks inherent by shippers.  
5.8.6.3 Risk mitigation 
Coordinating the interests of all stakeholders is the most efficient risk mitigation 
strategy. Such a strategy can be achieved through implementing a degree of 
common shareholding across assets and projects, developing an integrated 
transportation system for allocating capacity rights and guaranteeing a fair 
allocation of economic rent between assets and projects. A combination of 
intergovernmental agreements and host government agreements may help 
mitigate the risks. 
5.8.6.4 Financial objectives 
It is worthwhile highlighting why KCTS sponsors are considering raising limited 
resource debt: 
• limitations on their ability to fund their share on the balance sheet; 
• willingness to transfer project risks to lenders. 
A coordinated approach between sponsors and stakeholders is important for 
raising the necessary finance which promises to be an extremely complex task. 
Issues that sponsors should consider in structuring the KCTS project finance 
include:  
• Recognizing that the KCTS is structurally precarious as it is “caught” 
between other projects.  
• In order to cover risk allocation issues lenders will require security or 
sponsor support mechanisms.  
• Following the financial crisis of 2008-09 the amount of debt available for 
large scale projects has been significantly reduced. In addition, 
conditions and terms imposed by lenders have deteriorated dramatically.  
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• Commercial banks are no longer in a position to provide large amounts 
of long term project loans and for emerging markets in particular, the 
project bond market is virtually closed; 
• To structure the KCTS project sponsors may need potential trade-offs 
including equity stakes for investors (oil producers, lenders); the 
provision of guarantees over the safety of investment; offering share 
options if the company is profitable. 
• Higher risk investments yield higher returns. Therefore financing by pure 
debt can mitigate project risks but may be expensive. 
• In order to allow the project company to repay its debt, credit length 
should be realistic. According to Moody’s (2010) the length of project 
financed loans is usually greater than 20 years.    
5.8.7 Recommendations for the KCTS project 
Based on the abovementioned risks and considerations the following are 
recommended:  
• The evolution of a credible strategy for procuring and operating ships; 
• Preparation of pre-completion corporate guarantees to lenders;  
• Confirmation of oil volumes available and/ or dedicated to be shipped 
through KCTS; 
• To service debt annual project cash flows should be set at a sufficient 
level: the establishment of a payment regime, development of 
transparent payment adjustment mechanisms, address credit risk of 
shippers and entities underwriting project economics; 
• Be prepared for the possibility of cost overruns, force majeure and other 
contingencies, consider the arrangement of a credit line for additional 
funds 5%-15% from the projected amount of the project.  
• Consider the possibility for shippers and investors owning an equity 
stake in the project. This will allow the project company to ensure the 
volumes will come through the pipeline as having their stake the 
shippers will be interested in the success of the project; 
• Mitigate and hedge risks which are inherent in the project; 
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• Acknowledge the interdependency and mutual dependence of all 
participants of the Trans-Caspian Transportation system; ensure a 
consistent approach to different elements of debt markets (expansion of 
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6 Conclusion 
Project finance refers to the financing structure where a specially created 
project company (special purpose vehicle) is financed with non-recourse debt 
and equity from one or more sponsors with the goal of financing a single 
purpose project. The project company’s assets act as collateral for the loan and 
the loan is repaid from the future cash flows of that project company. Project 
finance is often used to finance industrial projects such as oil fields, pipelines, 
mines and infrastructure projects. Recently, due to a growing demand for funds 
in emerging markets and a shrinking availability of investment capital, project 
finance has become an alternative option for industrial and infrastructure 
projects.  
The main advantages of project finance are: 
• It provides financing on a limited or non-recourse basis, where sponsors 
are relieved from their contractual obligations to service the debt in case 
of the project’s default.  
• Project finance allows higher gearing than traditional corporate lending. 
High gearing can reduce the cost of capital by lowering the costs of 
borrowing compared to the cost of equity and tax-deductible interest 
compared to taxable returns on equity. 
• Project finance uses off-balance sheet accounting of project debt. This 
allows sponsors to undertake projects without damaging their 
creditworthiness or causing restrictions on borrowing. 
• Project financing may authorise sponsors to escape restrictions under 
their contract or based on regulatory limitations.  
• Project finance is an efficient tool for allocating risks among project 
participants. In corporate lending, concerns about a borrower’s balance 
sheet may result in a refusal to loan. On the other hand, in project 
finance risks can be shifted to more credible sponsors through different 
structures. In corporate financing, the risks are carried by the company 
itself while in project finance the risks are borne by the lenders. 
However, project finance is also time consuming and complex as risk allocation 
and security requires intensive negotiating and complicated legal procedures.  
Capital in project finance can be raised through equity and debt. The proportion 
of debt in project finance deals can be as high as 60%-95%. Usually, lenders 
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require equity contributions from the sponsor company to ensure that the 
project will be successfully implemented. Equity in the project company may be 
issued through shares (common stocks) or as debt (bonds and other debt 
instruments). Equity claims may also be structured as convertible debt, so that 
the claim holder can convert debt claims into equity. Alternatively to capital 
contributions, sponsors can make subordinated loans to the project company as 
equity or a combination of subordinated loans and equity. Traditionally, debt 
finance could can be raised through mezzanine debt, senior debt and public 
market debt offerings. Mezzanine finance is attractive to project sponsors as it 
offers lower rates of repayment than equity and is relatively secure. Senior debt 
can be raised from commercial banks and multilateral lending agencies. 
Multilaterals can provide political risk protection as host governments will be 
incentivised to repay the debt in order to have access to international financial 
funds in the future. Large loans can be organised in a form of syndicated loans, 
which allows the lenders to spread their risks among the banks. Public debt 
markets enable project sponsors to access to a wider range of buyers. 
Additionally, it has less restrictive covenants than in the private market and 
longer-term fixed rate debt.  
There are many risks integral to large projects among them are credit, 
construction, commercial, operations, political, currency risks.  In order to make 
decisions about project financing, all of the project’s potential risks should be 
considered as well as a financial feasibility study being undertaken prior to the 
beginning of a project. 
The Eurotunnel and Azerbaijan Caspian Oil Fields case studies demonstrate the 
possible ways of structuring project finance deals and different schemes of 
project financing. The Eurotunnel case shows the cost overrun and economic 
risks that accompany large, ambitious transportation projects and highlights the 
financial problems that can accompany high leverage. The Azerbaijan Caspian 
Oil Fields case demonstrate how large projects can be financed; what kind of 
options a company may have in defining the financing methods and what 
consequences financing decisions can have on the whole project.  
The Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System case study provides an 
overview of the current situation in project finance in emerging markets, 
particularly, in the Kazakhstan oil and gas sector. Although there are many 
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industrial projects in Kazakhstan, project finance is not as common there as in 
developed countries due to an imperfect legislative basis and weak financial 
markets. Limited domestic alternatives to raising long-term capital have led 
Kazakhstani banks to be over reliant on foreign borrowing. That has resulted in 
high rates of lending making Kazakhstan companies seek their funds from 
foreign financial institutions. Despite the significant financial and political risks of 
the KCTS project, several international financial institutions are interested in 
providing their financial services, among them are multilateral lending agencies 
and commercial banks. 
 The key issues that project sponsors should consider before structuring finance 
for KCTS are: 
• As KCTS is supposed to create a transport system which will deliver 
crude oil mainly from the Kashagan oil field to world markets via the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, it makes KCTS vulnerable to the risks 
internal to the Kashagan project, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and other 
interrelated systems.  
• Providers of funds will require security or sponsor support  mechanisms 
to cover any risk allocation issues, which will limit risks transfer.  
• The amount of debt available for large scale projects has been 
significantly reduced after the financial crisis of 2008-2009, while 
conditions and terms imposed by lenders have dramatically worsened.  
• Commercial banks are not willing to provide vast amounts of long term 
project loans; 
• Project sponsors may need to be more flexible in structuring the KCTS 
project. For example, considering the possibility of offering equity stakes 
for investors (oil producers, lenders); offering options to buy shares if 
the company is profitable. 
• Financing by pure debt can mitigate project risks but may be expensive 
as higher risk investments expect higher returns. 
• Credit length should be realistic in order to allow the project company to 
repay the debt.   
Based on the risks and considerations of the KCTS project the following 
recommendations are relevant: 
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• Development of a strategy to guarantee oil volumes to be shipped 
through KCTS in order to secure revenues and consequently debt 
servicing; 
• Set annual project cash flows at a level sufficient to service debt: 
establish a payment regime, develop transparent payment adjustment 
mechanisms, address the credit risk of shippers;  
• Be prepared to provide corporate guarantees to lenders;  
• Have funds available in case of cost overruns, force majeure and other 
contingencies; 
• Consider the possibility for shippers and investors to have equity stakes 
in the project; 
• Mitigate and hedge all risks which are inherent in the project; 
• Ensure unfettered access to export routes from Azerbaijan; 
• Acknowledge the interdependency between all participants of the Trans-
Caspian Transportation system. 
In overall, the answer to how large infrastructure projects can be financed and 
what possible financial structures could be adopted in such projects depends on 
several aspects of the project: risks, political issues, the sponsor company’s 
stance, the financial and political situation in the host country  and the linkages 
between the infrastructure projects and other stakeholders such as the host 
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